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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. TRIAL COURT PREJUDICED SPENCERS WHEN IT MISCONSTRUED 
OR OVERLOOKED MATERIAL FACTS IN THE RECORD 
Denying a litigant access to Utah courts to have federal claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 heard is inconsistent 
with the Constitution of Utah, [Article I Sections 1 and 11], 
which gives its citizens the 'inherent and inalienable' right to 
petition a state tribunal for redress of grievances in civil 
actions.1 
Furthermore, dismissing with prejudice premature or non-convenient 
federal civil rights claims with prejudice is 
contrary to the intent of the federal statute as well as the 
federal and state constitutions. . .[and] is beyond [the trial 
court's] discretionary powers and prejudiced the rights of the 
[Spencers].2 
The trial court's labeling of Spencers' claims as premature or not based on 
fact or law, and then dismissing them with prejudice was erroneous and 
must be reversed. 
A. The Spencers' Recorded Right-of-Way, Original Variances 
And Monies Paid Are Federally Protected Property Interests 
A federally protected property right arises when an independent 
source, such as state law, creates a legitimate claim of entitlement.3 A 
federally protected property right exists when a municipality is required by 
state or federal law to treat the property interest in a certain manner. 
1
 Kish v. Wright. 562 P.2d 625, 627 (Utah 1977). 
2 id. at 629. 
3
 Board of Regents v. Roth, 405 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). 
1 
Spencers assert that their recorded right-of-way, the original variances, 
and the $1,260 paid for the City's attorney fees are federally protected 
rights. 
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and Parties 
a. Spencers' Original Variances 
On July 11, 1983, the City granted a variance to the Spencers and 
their successor-in-interest that allowed the right to build on the West 
parcel. This variance allowed a home to be built fronting Spencers' non-
exclusive right-of-way instead of a public street. (Record at 267; Spencers' 
Brief at 6.) On February 8, 1993, without notice and hearing, five months 
after the City recorded the Cherrywood Phase III plat over the right-of-way, 
Spencers' variance for the West parcel was revoked by the City's Mayor. 
Because of the residential development around the property, without the 
variance, there could be no development of Spencers' property. (Record at 
273; Spencer's Brief at 8.) 
On March 31, 1986, a similar variance was granted to the Spencers 
for the East parcel that allowed building a home fronting the right-of-way 
instead of a public street. (Record at 276-77; Spencers' Brief at 6) On May 
19, 1995, without notice or hearing, Spencers were sent written notice by 
counsel for the City that their original variance would not be honored by the 
City. In addition, Spencers were notified that there was no mechanism by 
which the City could consider allowing the variance to stand. (Record at 
2 
281, 304.) Again, because of the residential development around the 
property, without the variance, there could be no development of this 
property. 
State law prohibited the City from making these unilateral 
determinations. First, the original variances themselves contained no time 
constraint or restriction as to when a building permit had to be issued. 
Second, the City had no statutory authority to revoke a variance without 
notice or hearing. Third, prior to any revocation of the variances, the Utah 
Legislature amended the legislation governing Board of Adjustments, 
adding a provision providing that "[v]ariances run with the land."4 Fourth, 
the Utah Constitution prohibits the City from taking action that violates 
state statutory provisions.5 
b. Non-Exclusive Riqht-of-Wav or Easement 
On May 10, 1983, the Spencers obtained and recorded, a non-
exclusive right of way across the land immediately south of their property 
that joined the undeveloped City right-of-way above public road 0021. 
(Record at 266; Spencers' Brief at 6.) On August 25, 1992, the 
"Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4). Similar language was included with the 
provisions governing variances granted on a county level. See Utah Code 
Ann. §10-17-707(4). 
5
 Utah Const., Article XI § 5; see also Price Development Company v. 
Orem City, 2000 UT 26, ffl[ 25-26; Alqood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 531-32 
(Utah 1976); Davis County v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 713 n. 10 (Ut. 
Ct. App.), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1998); State v. Hansen. 21 
Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968); Nance v. Mayflower Tavern. Inc., 106 
Utah 517,150 P.2d 773 (1944). 
3 
Cherrywood Manor Phase 3 was approved by the City Council and 
thereafter recorded by the City on September 18, 1992. (Record at 474.) 
The plat for Phase III overlaid Spencers' right-of-way. (Record at 272, 
279.) The City denied Spencers access to the procedures required for 
property development at least five times over a three year period on the 
grounds that Spencers were obligated to resolve this City caused problem. 
(See Opening Brief at 9.) 
Having already recognized the validity of the right-of-way in previous 
decisions by a decision of its Board of Adjustment, the City's change of 
position, without notice or hearing, and requiring the Spencers to resolve 
the burden of the City's error before they could begin the process 
necessary for City approval, made the Spencers recipients of "unfair land-
use procedures" of the City.6 The only way Spencers could resolve the 
City's error would be to sue the Homeowner Association of Cherrywood to 
quiet title in their prior-in-time, recorded right of way. If "[a] property owner 
is of course not required to resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair 
procedures in order to obtain this [final] determination,"7 a fortiori Spencers 
are not required to bear the burden of piecemeal litigation before being 
allowed to be heard by the City so a final decision can be rendered on the 
merits of Spencers' plans for development. 
6
 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001). 
7
 MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County. 477 U.S. 340, 350 n. 7 
(1986). 
4 
c. Payment of City's Attorney to Review Spencers' Submissions 
In light of the City's previous recognition of the Spencers' right-of-
way and issuance of two variances necessary for development, as well 
conflict-of-interest rules governing attorneys and public policy in that 
regard, (Record at 258-259), requiring Spencers to pay $1,260 for the 
City's attorney to review Spencers' submissions after the City revoked the 
granted variances similarly constituted another form of "unfair land-use 
procedures" by the City, all of which damaged Spencers, and unjustly 
enriched the City. The City cannot force the Spencers "to bear public 
burdens, [that began by reason of the City's malfeasance,] which in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."8 
2. Materiality of Failure to Recognize Federal Property Rights 
The trial court recognized the Spencers insistence that their claims 
that the variances were protected by state law, but ignored the significance 
that such a finding would have on Spencers' claims. 
The plaintiffs also allege that this Court failed to 
address, in its first decision, the impact of the statutory 
protections, applicable to the variances, issued to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiffs refer to this as a "core issue." (See plaintiffs 
memorandum, page 8.) The applicability of those variances 
was mooted by the City's issuance of the permits. (Again, see 
this Court's previous decision page 1.) This Court also ruled 
that there was no factual or legal basis to support plaintiffs' 
constitutional claims and thus there were no constitutional 
"Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). 
5 
claims to be addressed that arose from the variance issues. 
Finally, Article XI, Section 5 is not self-executing and provides 
no remedy for alleged statutory violation. These issues do not 
need to be addressed again. 
(Record at 601.) Because the trial court failed to recognize that Spencers' 
entitlement to constitutional protections and damages against the City rose 
from state and federal law that constrained the conduct of the City, the 
erroneous assumption that the City had issued the permits was allowed to 
"moot" the entire case and eliminated, with prejudice, Spencers right to 
damages. 
B. The City Issued No Building Permits 
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and Parties 
After Spencers filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking 
a ruling that their property interests were protected by the federal 
constitution, the City filed its tender of building permits and cross-motion 
for summary judgment based on mootness and other arguments. In 
Spencers' memorandum in opposition, they specifically pointed out that 
[ejfforts of the Spencers to obtain the building permits as 
represented by counsel have not been successful. (Spencer 
Affidavit at fl 6 [q]).. The Notice, Tender of Performance, and 
Suggestion of Mootness is not applicable because the 
Spencers have not yet received the two building permits 
indicated in the City's filings. 
(Record at 237, 241.) Thereafter, in Spencers' motion to revise the court's 
earlier granting of summary judgment in favor of the City, Spencers drew 
attention again to the fact of non-issuance of the building permits. (Record 
6 
at 517.) At no time did the City claim that the building permits had not 
been issued. 
Nonetheless, the trial court was confused about the issuance of the 
permits and its impact on Spencers' claims. In its first memorandum 
decision of October 2, 2000, the Court found that 
[t]he first issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' request for 
the issuance of two building permits. Since the Defendant has 
agreed to issue the requested building permits, that issue is 
now moot. 
(Record at 503.) Thereafter, in the trial court's decision of September 28, 
2001, Judge West interpreted his prior opinion and wrote his new opinion 
as if the building permits had been granted. 
In its earlier opinion, this Court also stated that with the 
issuance of the building permits, the plaintiffs' constitutional 
claims were now premature. . . .Finally, the plaintiffs sought 
among other remedies, equitable relief. They wanted the 
Court to order the defendant to issue the building permits. 
They claimed that the defendant was denying them due 
process of law and equal protection by refusing to issue those 
permits. Once those permits were issued, those claims 
became moot. 
(Record at 596 (emphasis added.)) 
On appeal, the Spencers again challenged the trial court's 
conclusion that the permits were issued—the City's tender was conditional, 
the Spencers had not received the building permits, and it was not 
"absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably 
be expected to occur." (Opening Brief at 22-23 (citation omitted.)) The City 
7 
rejoined that the tender is "contained within the trial court records and is 
binding upon the City." (City's Brief at 4-5). Neither Spencers nor the City 
have claimed on appeal that the building permits have been issued. 
2. Materiality of the Error Regarding Issuance of Permits 
The trial court's misunderstanding that the building permits had been 
issued appears to have been an integral part of its ruling that Spencers' 
constitutional claims were moot, premature and without factual or legal 
basis. Based on the record, it was error to make such a finding. In 
addition, without the issuance of building permits, the City failed to present 
evidence in support of its "'heavy burden of persuading the court that the 
challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.'"9 
C. Spencers Asserted Constitutional Rights in A Timely Fashion 
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and the Parties 
In the trial court, the City argued that United States Supreme Court 
"ripeness" precedent in Williamson County10 as interpreted by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Bateman11 indicated that the federal takings, 
due process and equal protection were not "ripe" for review because 
Spencers had not already sought compensation in state court for damages 
9
 Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOO. Inc., 
528 U.S. 167,189(2000). 
10
 See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City. 473 U.S. 172, (1985), ("Williamson County"). 
11
 See Bateman v. City of West Bountiful. 89 F.3d 704 (10** Cir. 1996) 
("Bateman.") 
8 
under Article I § 22. Spencers argued that "nothing in the specific statutory 
provisions of U.C.A. § 10-9-708 indicates that the provisions were 
designed to preclude district court review of federal or state statutory, 
constitutional claims, or claims for equitable relief." (Record at 242.) The 
preservation of Spencers' claims against the City was reviewed, reciting 
the original filing of a complaint on May 2, 1996, and thereafter the present 
litigation on August 16, 1998. (Record at 224-245.) Case law relied on by 
the City to justify a claim of laches was distinguished. (Record at 246-247) 
Apparently, the trial court relied on the City's Williamson County -
Bateman argument to dispose of the Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. 
Initially, the trial court ruled as follows: 
The second issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' claim that 
their constitutional rights have been violated. The Court 
agrees with the Defendant and finds that the statute of 
limitations and laches' are applicable and these causes of 
action are barred. See Section 10-9-1001 and Section 78-12-
25(3) Utah Code Annotated. In particular, the Plaintiffs' had 
thirty days, after any adverse decision, to appeal the adverse 
decision and they failed to do so. In addition, the Court finds 
that the constitutional claims are premature and have no 
factual or legal basis to support them. 
(Record at 503-504.) 
In Spencers' motion to revise the court's first ruling, the limiting 
nature of the opinion as to when constitutional claims could be brought 
was emphasized. (Record at 517-520.) A thirty-day statute of limitation 
was argued against on grounds that it (1) violated the provisions of Article I 
9 
§ 11, (2) conflicted with other statutes, (3) on-going wrongs created new 
injury each day, and (4) federal case law had already determined that 
federal civil rights claims could be brought in four years. (Record at 517-
520). Spencers also argued that Williamson County - Bateman position 
was contrary to the practice of the Utah Supreme Court, the City's action 
was final because no further action was required under state law, and 
when there has been a "tortuous and protracted history of attempts to 
develop the property," relief could be granted without state court 
exhaustion. (Record at 549-550). The City relied on its previous 
arguments and the Court's original ruling. (Record at 535-549.) 
In its second opinion, the trial court adopted the reasoning of the 
City and held that where the City of Pleasant View made decisions that 
were not timely appealed by the Spencers under U.C.A. § 10-9-1001, the 
statute barred the "applicable claims that were not of a constitutional 
nature." (Record at 600.) 
While the City has conceded on appeal that the Spencers claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are timely insofar as they arose during the four 
years before the filing of the present complaint (City's Brief at 18-19), the 
City has renewed the argument on appeal that they are not ripe for review 
under Williamson County - Bateman and remain subject to a claim of 
laches. (City's Brief at 19-20.) 
10 
2. Williamson County - Bateman "Ripeness" Argument To Prohibit 
Review of Federal Claims Is In Error 
The City's reliance on the Williamson County - Bateman doctrine to 
prohibit state court review of federal takings, due process and equal 
protection claims in conjunction with a takings claim under state law is in 
error for at least three reasons. 
a. Binding Utah Precedent Has Considered Both Utah 
and Federal Constitution Takings Claims At the Same Time 
In the 1990 case of Farmer's New World Life Insurance Company v. 
Bountiful City.12 the Utah Supreme Court evaluated the takings claims of 
the Petitioner under both Article I § 22 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In 1997, in 
Brendle v. City of Draper,13 the Utah Court of Appeals remanded for 
adjudication and review simultaneous claims of a taking of property without 
just compensation in violation of the relevant federal and state 
constitutional provisions. The trial court's dismissal of all of Spencers' 
federal constitutional claims on grounds of ripeness (or categorizing them 
as "premature,") is incongruent with this binding precedent. 
b. Only Federal Precedent from the United States Supreme Court 
Is Binding Upon Utah Courts 
"Since the United States Supreme Court has supremacy on issues 
of federal law, it is proper that state courts follow its lead in federal 
,2803P.2d1241 (Utah 1990). 
13
 937 P.2d 1044,1047 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
11 
matters." The rationale and results of United States Supreme Court 
opinions are binding both on that Court and state courts. "When an opinion 
issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the 
opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound."15 As such, the 
Tenth Circuit Bateman opinion is not binding on Utah courts. 
c. The Williamson-Bateman Result Conflicts With the Results 
of Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court "Takings" Precedent 
The result of two post-Bateman United States Supreme Court cases 
that involved takings claims are in conflict with the Williamson County -
Bateman analysis proposed by the City.16 
(i) No Exhaustion of Compensatory Taking Required for Due Process and 
Egual Protection Claims 
The 1999 case of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey 
Del Monte Dunes17 ("Del Monte Dunes") was a developer's regulatory 
takings claim that arose "not [because] the city had followed its zoning 
14
 Broadbent v. Board of Education, 910 P.2d 1274,1279 (Utah App. 1996) 
cert, denied 917 P.2d 556 (emphasis added.) 
15
 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996). 
16
 For citation and review of other Supreme Court cases that specify each 
constitutional claim will be analyzed on its own merits regardless of the 
presence of another constitutional claim, see John Corporation vs. City of 
Houston. 214 F.3d 573, 580-585 (11 th Cir. 2002). 
17
 526 U.S. 687, 722, (1999), as cited in Signature Properties International 
Limited Partnership v. City of Edmond. 310 F.3d 1258,1267 (10th Cir. 
2002). The Tenth Circuit assumed that the same description would apply 
to a violation of substantive due process by engaging in arbitrary conduct. 
Id. 
12 
ordinances and policies but rather it had not done so. The United States 
Supreme Court accepted the Ninth's Circuit determination that there had 
been "finality" in the City's conduct sufficient to bring a takings, due 
process and equal protection claim. The pre-requisite of obtaining state 
court relief for a "takings" was only analyzed as it related to the "ripeness" 
prong of the compensation component; no such analysis was made for the 
claims of "due process" and "equal protection."19 
In Del Monte Dunes, the Ninth Circuit did not require exhaustion of 
state compensation procedures because, as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court, at the time of the City's final decision, there was no 
procedure in the state of California by which compensation could be had 
for inverse condemnation.20 The absence of "a reasonable, certain and 
adequate provision for obtaining adequate compensation. . .at the time of 
the taking"21 eliminated the state exhaustion requirement for the 
compensation prong of a federal takings claim. 
The City argues on appeal that for Spencers to establish a claim 
under Article I § 22 for a "temporary taking" they must "demonstrate that 
the City deprived them of all economically viable use of the property." 
18
 jd-at 722. 
19
 Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey. 920 F.2d 1496,1506-
1507 (9th Cir. 1990); Del Monte Dunes, supra, 526 U.S. at 698-99. 
20
 The Ninth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court holding in 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987). See Del Monte Dunes, supra, 920 F.2d at 1507. 
21
 Williamson County, supra, 473 U.S. at 194. 
13 
(City's Brief at 25.) While Spencers dispute that this is the current 
standard of the Utah Supreme Court, (see pages 18-19, infra,) assuming 
arguendo that this was the standard for a "temporary taking" of Spencers' 
property at the time of the City's conduct, Utah's compensation for inverse 
condemnation is not adequate because that standard is less than that 
provided by the United States Constitution. 
Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of 
eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking may 
nonetheless have occurred, depending on a complex of 
factors including the regulation's economic effect on the 
landowner, the extent to which the regulations interferes with 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action. Penn Central, supra, at 
124. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the 
Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from 
'forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.'22 
In all events, jury damages were allowed for federal claims of taking, 
denial of due process, and equal protection. The jury had been instructed 
to resolve the factual claim that 
whether in light of all the history and context of this case, the 
city's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final 
development proposal was reasonably related to the City's 
proffered justifications.23 
22Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), relying on Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978) (citation also 
omitted.) ("Penn Central") 
23
 Del Monte Dunes, supra, 526 U.S. at 706. 
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Spencers specifically brought this very language given to the jury to the 
trial court's attention and sought relief under its authority. 
Like Del Monte Dunes, the Spencers similarly qualify for a 
factual evaluation of their efforts and the City's over-zealous 
and illegal refusal to issue them a building permit in 
accordance with the variance that ran with their land. 
(Record at 252.) The trial court ignored this request. 
(ii) Exhaustion of State Court Compensation Remedies Does Not 
Limit Federal Takings Claims in State Court 
In the 2001 case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.24 ("Palazzolo"), 
the United States Supreme Court reviewed an appeal from the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island had dismissed a claim filed in state court for federal 
and state compensation for a "takings" on the grounds that the "finality" of 
the taking was not yet ripe for judicial review. There was no mention or 
discussion in the State Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court 
opinion of being required to exhaust state remedies regarding 
compensation first.25 The case was remanded for federal takings review 
under Penn Central. This result is contrary to the Williamson County -
Bateman requirement of exhaustion of all state remedies for compensation 
prior to hearing any federal claims in state court. 
24
 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606, 617-618 (2001). 
25
 Compare Palazzolo v. State of Rhode Island. 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000) 
with Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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3. Materiality of the Error 
Even had the trial court recognized Spencers' federally protected 
property interests, misconstruing the applicable federal and state 
standards governing the "ripeness" of Spencers constitutional claims 
contributed to the trial court's dismissal of the claims. 
D. There Was Proper Evidence of Damages in the Trial Court Record 
1. Conduct of the Trial Court and the Parties 
The trial court's memorandum decisions limited how and when 
Spencers could claim damages from the City for its failure to previously 
issue building permits. First, the trial court required damages be shown in 
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. 
In this instance, equitable remedies addressed the plaintiffs' 
injuries. The permits were obtained. There is nothing, 
submitted to the [district court], in plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment, that establishes that the plaintiffs suffered 
any economic damage as a result of the delay in issuing the 
permits. 
(Record at 598.) This overlooked the damages claims raised in the record 
by the Affidavit of Dennis Spencer, and incorporated in the analysis used 
in the Memorandum In Opposition to the City's summary judgment motion. 
(Record at 239-240; 291-293.) Second, the trial court sought to limit 
Spencers to those damages that arose after the City's tender of the 
building permits. 
16 
Since the City of Pleasant View offered to issue the permits to 
the plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that would 
support a finding that the plaintiffs had been otherwise 
damaged. 
hese standards in error, but they are also 
contrary ^ v,» 
Contrary to flie assertions by the trial court the Spenret*- • !•• I h.r, 
i-viiioiii -i «ii damages in the trial record, As noted in the Onei....y ., . y 
Affidavit .i. . .gihtioant damages 
against th> ~'; .^ «. IUVV 11 i d I 
11)93, II ley lost a sale of part of parcel 16-023-0004 of $24,900; in 1996, 
they lo t si. to repurchase one 
of the properties back at a cost of $10 i i 
required borrowing of nrr~r. *l payments of principal and nt- *•*• 
BTP i " ' I I '.'uu'1'' njustified, numerous requests for 
revised engineering plar ir icreased. , / on 
Besides having had to pay $1,260 for the City's n'tornev 
Spei personal attorney fees seekmy, in pail, the relief 
belatedly provided L ^ ^/om i n excess of 
$15,000; court costs were $390. (Opening Brief at 16-18). 
U.AU( :r'~ -'- lages, the Spencers m^o 
complained th ,ir properfw 
1
 fnrinnces "^ r g h i j i . . ^ f i..u ^.,^60 paid and 
4 - U -
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develop the property. Spencers documented a loss of use of their property 
by showing the City interfered with use of the right-of-way. For example, 
the City recorded the Cherrywood plat over the right-of-way (Record at 
279) and Chief Cragun, as a policy maker of the City, condoned Dennis 
Spencer's arrest for being on the right-of-way (Record at 289-291). The 
City ignored Spencers' prior-in-time, recorded right of way from May 1993 
through November 1996 when Spencers could not access the City's 
processes for property development. (See Opening Brief at 9.) From 
February 8, 1993 through December 20, 1999, the City would not 
recognize the binding nature of the original variances and burdened 
Spencers' property with extra costs and delays through inconsistent, 
undefined, and changing requirements. (See Opening Brief 10-13) 
Spencers also demonstrated damages necessary to prove an 
"inverse condemnation" claim under Article I § 22 of the Utah Constitution 
requires "(1) property, (2) a taking or damaging, and (3) a public use."26 
The parties have disputed whether or not their was a "taking". 
A 'taking' is 'any substantial interference with private property 
which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the 
owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial 
degree abridged or destroyed.'27 
26
 Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17 If 27, 42 P.3d 379. 
27
 Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City. 918 P.2d 870 at 
876 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
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On December ", 'MP'1 ||, " | ,|, , ipn me ' ...I .ucognized ILit 
damages under an inverse condemnation cla* / 
evidence of "loss of use, of physical damage, or an actual diminution in the 
As noted above, Spencers clearly drmnnslmlril linn In",1 nl IT ' n.f 
the property and that without recognition of the original variances and 
r npossiD.i >- ? Opening Br"t f at 
16-18.) Spenceis - ••' : f 
the property, securing trie right-of-way and v ariances were all parts of their 
"liiveslui LJ expectatio fevelop and resell the property for 
residential r ? nme on one 
portion of the property is sufficient ^ .su deprive the owner of ai 
use of the property,""0 w,Uw -voulrl not the inability • uiin any building 
"in «,'".tjiiu ^ oroperty, of all 
reasonable investor back^v. ^jjectations?30 
Finally, as if relates generally to damage claims, even if specific and 
nencers would be entitled to 
28
 Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, fflf 50-51, 2002 Utah 
LEXIS 220. 
29 5 e e Paiazzolo, supra, 
30
 See Penn Central supra, 
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claim nominal damages for the City's violation of their federally protected 
rights.31 
2. Materiality of the Error 
But for the failure of the trial court to recognize the evidence of 
damages raised by Spencers in the record, the trial court could not have 
dismissed Spencers claim of entitlement to damages for the City's violation 
of their federal and state protected property rights. 
Claiming damages was recognized as a key component of strategy 
suggested by the United States Supreme Court in the Buckhannon opinion 
to protect Plaintiffs from loss of fees and costs in an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 when "voluntary" conduct of formerly recalcitrant 
government defendants mooted the request for injunctive relief. 
The Court discounted the petitioners' arguments that 
'mischievous defendants' could avoid liability for attorney fees 
in a meritorious suit by voluntarily changing their conduct, 
because 'so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for 
damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the 
case. 
31
 Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 858 P.2d 1372, 1378 & n. 4 
(Utah 1993) (citation omitted.) ("A Plaintiff cannot recover more than 
nominal damages for procedural due process violations unless it is shown 
that there would have been no deprivation had proper procedures been 
followed or that if the deprivation had occurred under the procedure, the 
lack of procedure caused actual harm"). 
32
 Buckhannon Board and Health Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598, 608-609 (2001) 
("Buckhannon"), as cited in Loggerhead Turtle, et. al. vs. County Council of 
Volusia County, Florida, 307 F.3d 1318,1326 (11 th Cir. 2002). 
20 
Thus not only A^.KX- >W bpencers 
federally protected property rights and the damaqes .)iisin<i ii' m Hi > ( ii, *, 
violation of the same, but they also removed a protection the United States 
. ... " plaintiffs, like II ic 
Spencers, who were iorceu u * imenlal 
entities. 
II. SPENCER H K L PREVAILING PARTIES" UNDER 
4? M S C . 6 1988 
Based on all of the foregoing, Spencers ? mal 
court's summary judgment reversed and ... _u^e remanded lor ihe 
takiiri "I '•"'ulenui .mi i i !1 imiii ill M I I nl 11, images for the violation of their 
federal and state constitutional i . 
rulings, a p"srf" ~T ' prevail on merits of his claims wn c-r 
Notwithstanding ilu1 IOKMIHIIHI, even il un» Spencers are not entitled 
to any more eiie*' nan the tende. ~, buildina • ' • 4 
Id I XN) onirary -^presentations '""in tinef a- or several 
,v.UoOns, Spennr •> ..:ijur bucknannon. 
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 440 11'» ' ' " 'r«7 i i i ^ i i 
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First, Spencers could not have submitted a motion and affidavit to 
receive attorney fees under Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-505 
until the trial court ruled they were entitled to the same.34 
Second, the Spencers letter to the trial court indicated that while the 
Buckhannon opinion was "relevant, in part, but not dispositive of Spencers' 
claims." (Record at 593). Spencers distinguished their situation from that 
of Buckhannon because (1) they had sought damages as well as injunctive 
relief, (2) cessation of a practice did not deprive the trial court of its 
authority to determine the legality of the practice, unless it is absolutely 
clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior will occur, and (3) despite 
Spencers challenge to the City's infringement on a previously granted 
variance, confirmed by state law, and a duty to pay attorney fees of the 
City for the City's review of Spencers' applications, no evidence was 
introduced by the City to show that the prior practices of the City would not 
occur again. (Record at 592-593). 
Third, Plaintiffs had previously argued as part of their approach on 
the "catalyst" theory that the parties had changed their legal relationship,35 
the essence of the requirement of Buckhannon test cited in the Spencers' 
Opening Brief. (See page 19.) 
34
 See N.A.R., Inc. v. Marcek, 2000 UT App 300, fflf 14-15; 13 P.3d. 612. 
35
 "Civil rights case law recognizes that when parties have changed their 
legal relationship, (and these parties have),.. ." (Record at 544.) 
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Fourth, making a unilateral "bindinq" aq^ement (City's Rriff nl 1 'i) 
*n issue h;:;!dinn permits and pay $1,26 Spencers, (which ub m 
.., n.M.,; arguments and subsequent rulings of 
the trial court rulinas • ' ileii ,i in.IU 11,u ,ui^i. 
relationship of the parties."36 
Fifth, the final "judicial imprimatur" or ruling on both the arguments 
regarding tender of buildin< 
available tor review or argument at the time Spencers' letter was submitted 
because the trial court had not issued its second memorandum decision or 
Ihc fiii.il mill ' i in Hit1 i <r>t' 
Both ol the court orders grantina ne city's motion lm Mirniu.-iry 
judgment and the final order of dismissal incorporated bv reference the 
( M I N I mi nun Milium ill i i inn > i l u i iu , in il iln.1 .v...vic.ihy BSUance of 
building permits by the City and paymonl nl $1 ''(ill (hm mil n ' i in rwh ) 
Subsequent to the trial court's final ruling, several federal court of appeals 
h.ivo determined that this kind "oh'ement satisfies the 
requirements of Buckhannon. 
A plaintiff who obtains a court order incorporating an 
agreement that includes relief the plaintiff sought in the 
lawsuit is a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees under 42 
U.S.C. S1988.37 
36
 Buckhannon Board and Health Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Services. 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001). 
37
 Labotest v. Bonta, 297 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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[E]ven absent the entry of a formal consent decree, if the 
district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into 
its final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction, it 
may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties' agreement.38 
By analogy, the City's conduct was tantamount to a Rule 68 offer of 
judgment that was accepted by the trial court. 
[Ujnlike a 'defendant's voluntary change in conduct' or a 
purely private settlement resulting in a dismissal, a Rule 68 
judgment represents a 'judicially sanctioned change in the 
relationship between the parties.' 
The City's Tenth Circuit opinion is based on facts not relevant to this 
case.40 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court overlooked material facts and arguments Spencers 
had placed in the record that established (1) their recorded right-of-way 
and original variances were property rights subject to protection of the 
United States Constitution, (2) the City had not issued any building permits 
to Spencers, (3) Spencers asserted their constitutional rights in a timely 
fashion, and (4) appropriate evidence was in the record to raise questions 
of fact regarding damages suffered by Spencers by reason of the City's 
38
 American Disability Association, Inc. vs. Ariel Chmielarz. 289 F.3d 1315, 
1320 (11th Cir. 2002) 
39
 Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, 
Inc., 298 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2002). 
40
 Griffin v.Steeltek, inc.. 261 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) 
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summary 
judgment in favor of the City must be reversed and the case remanded. 
Even if Spencers obtain no more relief than the "binding" tender of 
liiiilf inn I |w<ini|i<. .Hid 'l i i/ ' i i i i imm IIK> ('.iiy, (|K> ('unit's integration and 
reference to those '>.••.- ements in its decision1 in«i unHi^ s m/ii*.. sp^v *i\s 
a prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees and costs. 
DA I bU and LXtOJ I LI.) this 241" <l,.iy ol January, 2003. 
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